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Abstract 
Over the past few years, research in corporate governance has devoted increased attention to board of directors’ 
involvement in the strategic decision making process. But in spite of its growing interest, the literature provides 
theoretical pluralism and mixed empirical results. Indeed, the concept has not been well defined by past studies 
and there is no consensus about its operationalization.  
In this paper, we review the literature on board’s involvement in the strategic decision making process and 
question the definitions of this phenomenon and if an operational measure can be proposed for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over last years, major events have encouraged academic research in corporate governance to 
devote increased attention to board of directors’ involvement in strategic decision making 
process.  
First,  corporate  governance  scandals  and  the  recent  financial  crisis  generate  many  critics 
about various aspects of board functioning as competence, behavior and composition. The 
uncertainty  of  major  issues  as  the  developing  and  implementing  of  strategy  require  more 
involved members with appropriate skills and knowledge (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). 
Moreover, the developing of legalistic environment (new laws, numerous reports of good 
practices  in  corporate  governance)  generate  a  great  pressure  on  Board  of  Directors  (BD) 
functioning  and  apply  for  more  transparency  and  accountability  of  boards  in  taking  their 
strategic responsibilities. 
Second,  recurrent  critics  of  actionnarial  approach  (dominant  framework  in  corporate 
governance, Charreaux and Debrières, 1998) have influenced the orientation of literature on 
BD. The actionnarial approach present many theoretical limits in explaining BD composition 
(reduced in demographic characteristics) and BD roles (reduced in management monitoring 
without recognition of its strategic role). However, many scholars as Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
Pettigrew (1992), Pugliese et al (2009) called for more process studies on board dynamics and 
involvement  in  establishing  strategy.  Moreover,  research  in  corporate  governance  is 
characterized  by  the  dominance  of  empirical  investigation  of  the  input/output  relation.  In 
other terms, many empirical studies investigate the linkage between corporate governance 
best practices (especially CEO/Chair duality and insider/outsider composition) and corporate 
performance. However, research findings have generally failed to support clear cause-effect 
between the two (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Heracleous, 2001; Pye and Camm, 2003). 
Heracleous propose four explanations. First, it is possible that these factors are irrelevant to 
corporate performance as argued by Johson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) i.e. -this relationship 
does not exist in nature-. Second, researchers are often unable to observe governance actors 
‘in action’, thus, the operationalization of theoretical concepts has a low validity. Third, many 
studies often seek to correlate board attributes directly to organizational performance, or the 
process is more complex. Finally, there are a great difference between organizations, thus 
practices  in  corporate  governance  diverge.  He  explain  that  mixed  results  about  the 
relationship  between  board  attributes  and  performance  include  conceptual  issues  such  as 3
ignoring  contextual  factors  and  their  effects  on  boards  and  company  performance,  the 
insufficient attention to group dynamics, and the complexity of the process that cannot be well 
captured by  empirical  models.  Pettigrew (1992) argued, in addition, that the relationship 
between  demographic  characteristics  (composition)  and  organizational  outcomes  such  as 
corporate performance is not direct and the process could not be explained via the direct link.   
To answer to this current events and critics, a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature 
was  developed  recently  and  treated  the  subject  of  board  involvement  in  strategy  under 
different  angles  of  analysis  exploring  board  strategic  activities,  behavior,  and  dynamics 
(Huse, 2007; Pugliese et al, 2009). Despite the growing literature about the phenomenon, past 
studies present some limits:  
-  The  lack  of  conceptual  definition  of  board  involvement  and  consensus  about  its 
operationalization: Studying past literature highlight that authors used different terms  to refer 
to ‘board involvement’ as ‘task performance’, ‘board activities’, ‘board strategic contribution’ 
etc.  without  presenting  conceptual  definition.  In  consequent,  we  observe  different 
operationalizations and methodologies in studying this subject. Many scholars focused on 
board contribution in steps of the strategic process, other group of studies focused on the 
strategic  output  of  board  activity,  and  a  last  group  focused  on  the  determinants  of  board 
involvement.  
-  The  lack  of  process  model  about  board  involvement:  The  strategic  choice  and  the 
cognitive perspectives have contributed to develop theoretical analysis of how and why board 
contributes  in  strategic  process.  Some  authors  developed  integrative  models  based  on 
complementarity between opposite theories (especially agency and stewardship theories) to 
describe a general set of board tasks. However, it still lacks of analysis of the general process 
of board involvement which, reflect board dynamics and process, how internal and external 
contingencies  could  influence  it  and  the  effect  on  organizational  outcomes.  Some  recent 
studies as Pye and Pettigrew (2005), Minichilli, Zona and Zattoni, (2009) and Zang (2010) 
highlight the need of process model that explores variation in board process and effectiveness 
in different organizational contexts.  
-  The lack of empirical conclusiveness: the study of empirical researches about board 
strategic involvement reveal mixed results. There is no convergence about the desirability of 
board  involvement  and  about  its  determinants  factors.  Furthermore,  almost  empirical 
researches  have  simplified  the  strategic  process  on  two  main  steps  (formulation  and 4
implementation) as Judge and Zeilthaml (1992),Heracleous (2001), Huat Ong and Hoon Lee 
(2000),  Paye and Camm (2003), Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009). 
The purpose of the paper is to examine the evolution of literature on board involvement in 
strategic decision making and to analyze and question the definitions of this concept and if an 
operational measure can be proposed for future research. 
The  paper  is  divided  in  three  sections.  In  the  first  section,  we  present  an  appraising  of 
definitions  of  ‘involvement’  and  ‘board  involvement’  and  a  synthetic  definition  of  the 
phenomena. In the second section, we present the theoretical and empirical debate about BD 
involvement in the strategic process. In the last section, we propose a synthesis of determinant 
factors and effects of BD involvement that could be used in future empirical research.  
1. Analysing of definitions of board involvement in the strategic decision 
making process and suggestion of synthetic definition 
In corporate board research, the term involvement was exclusively related to BD participation 
in strategy. However, it is difficult to attribute a general definition because of the variety of its 
uses and measures applied in theoretical and empirical studies. In this section, we present, 
first, a summary of main definitions and interpretations used to describe board involvement in 
strategy or in the decision making process. Next, we refer to other fields of research where the 
concept of involvement is well defined as psychology, marketing and organizational behavior. 
The objective is to look for attributes of this concept and how it could be applied in BD 
research. Finally, we propose a synthetic definition bases on crossing between these elements 
and literature on BD involvement in strategy. 
1.1 Definitions and operational uses of board involvement in the corporate governance 
research 
To refer to board involvement in the strategic process, different expressions are used as ‘board 
strategic  involvement’,  ‘strategic  participation/contribution’  or  ‘board  task  performance’.  
Because of the theoretical pluralism and the lack of satisfactory theory about BD (Charreaux, 
2000), we find a variety of visions and interpretations:  
-  Which BD roles are concerned? Some authors define the phenomena as the strategic 
role of the board, like Andrews (1980, 1981a, 1981b) and Demb and Neubauer (1992).  It is 5
considered as “the overall level of participation of board members in making non-routine 
decisions  that  affect  the  long-term  performance  of  an  organization”  (Judge  and  Zeitmal, 
1992). However, other group of scholars as Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009) and Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) relate it to both control and service roles. Control tasks include decisions 
regarding hiring and compensation management. The service tasks include providing experts 
during major events and generating and analysis strategic alternatives during board meeting
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999, p. 492). 
-  Which strategic steps are concerned? Some authors simplify the strategic process in 
only two steps and evaluate board involvement by its participation or not in these two steps. 
We find in this tradition Judge and Zeilthaml (1992), Heracleous (2001), Huat Ong and Hoon 
Lee (2000), Paye and Camm (2003), Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009). Other group of 
scholars considers only the step of strategic formulation (Andrews, 1980; Rindova, 1999). 
Some  others  consider  a  large  vision  of  the  strategic  process  containing  formulation, 
implementation, evaluation and control as Demb and Neubauer, (1992) and Huse, (2007). 
-  Which set of activities? There are a variety of sets of activities proposed by authors 
depending on their vision of strategy and board roles. For example Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona 
(2009)  propose  a  set  of  six  tasks  related  both  to  service  (advice,  networking  and  strategic 
participation) and control (behavioral output and strategic control) (p. 56).” McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1999) propose three types of tasks: taking decision’, ‘shaping decisions’ and ‘shaping the content, 
context and conduct of strategy’. For Zhang (2010, p. 474), it covers set of activities such as, the 
development of the firm’s mission and vision, the formulation of business concepts, the evaluation and 
control of strategic proposals and the implementation of approved strategies.
-  Link with effectiveness? Some scholars consider the phenomenon as the effectiveness 
or the performance of BD in assuming its tasks (as Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009, and Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). However, the effectiveness represents an evaluation of board functioning; 
indeed, do not cover different types and manners of involvement. In other studies, scholars 
argued that board can be involved to various degrees in each of its areas of activities (Huse, 
2007). 
The  following  table  resumes  definitions  and  visions  adopted  by  main  works  on  BD 
involvement in strategic process. 6
Table 1: Main interpretations (definitions) of board involvement in strategic process 
Author  Definition 
Andrews 
(1980) 
Andrews (1980) argues that board of directors is in a great position to contribute on the strategic 
planning  and  formulation.  He  associates  an  effective  ‘board  strategic  contribution’  to  Board 
involvement in the critical strategic issues as generating alternatives and search for new opportunities 
[…], also, in supporting management imagination, overviewing innovative processes and reviewing 
CEO propositions”.  
Rindova 
(1999) 
Rindova (1999), board involvement in strategy is associated to directors’ participation in the thinking 




McNulty  and  Pettigrew  (1999)  have  proposed  a  detailed  set  of  strategic  activities  that  board  of 
directors can insure during the strategic decision making process. They identify choice, change and 
control as key aspects of corporate strategy and illustrate three level of board involvement in strategy: 




Forbes and Milliken (1999) defined ‘board task performance’ as the board’s ability to perform its 
control  and  service  tasks  effectively  […]  control  tasks  include  decisions  regarding  hiring  and 
compensation  management.  The  service  tasks  include  providing  experts  during  major  events  and 




Judge and Zeithaml (1992) propose: “the overall level of participation of board members in making 
non-routine, organization-wide resource allocation decisions that affect the long-term performance of 




Demb and Neubauer (1992) consider establishing the strategic direction of the corporation as the most 
important task of board of directors (P.50). In consequence, a meaningful board involvement, for 
them, is characterized by the manner in which directors help to define company strategy (p.55) [….] it 
depends on the strategy process (p. 73).   
Stiles and 
Taylor (2001) 
Stiles  and  Taylor  (2001)  associate  board  involvement  in  strategic  decision  making  in  large 
organizations to “setting the context of strategy” through several activities: reviewing the corporate 
definition, actively assessing and reviewing strategic proposals and often changing proposals through 
comment and advice […] encouraging management with good track records in their strategic aims 
and through the selection of directors”.(P. 31)
Huse (2007) 
Huse (2007) argued that board strategic involvement is widely related to the content of strategy. He 
define strategy as “the development, maintenance and monitoring of the firms’ core competencies with 
the purpose of achieving long-term results and survival. Strategic decision-making involves resolving 
uncertainty,  complexity  and  conflict”  (P.239).  So,  board  strategic  involvement  covers  “corporate 
mission  development,  strategy  conception  and  formulation,  and  strategy  implementation  […]  the 
board can be involved to various degrees in each of these areas.” (p. 240)
Karoui (2009) 
For Karoui (2009), board involvement represents the effective measurement of the intensity with which 
board undertakes its strategic activities (P.152). It is related to different forms of board activation.  
The author defines board activation as “the decision to make a portfolio of activities. This decision can 
be individual or collective, deliberated or emergent, voluntary or forced. Board activation leads to the 
expression of a set of expectations and generates either strong or weak level of commitment on boards 




Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009) defined board task performance as “the ability of the board to 
perform six tasks related both to service (advice, networking and strategic participation) and control 
(behavioral, output and strategic control) (p. 56).”  This empirical definition was inspirited from the 
theoretical framework of Huse (2005) about board involvement and the model of Zona and Zattoni 
(2006) of board task effectiveness.  
Zhang (2010) 
Zhang (2010) have studied empirically the impact of possessing and using diverse information of 
board members on the quality of board task performance. They define board task performance as “a 
source of competitiveness, which can protect the firm’s long-term health against managerial short-
term plans.” It covers set of activities such as, the development of the firm’s mission and vision, the 
formulation  of  business  concepts,  the  evaluation  and  control  of  strategic  proposals  and  the 
implementation of approved strategies.(p. 474)7
In short, a review of the literature quickly reveals that one researcher's definition and use of 
"board involvement" is very different from another's. Most studies never specifically define 
what they mean by involvement. Perhaps, they simply use the term and assume the reader 
understands the concept. Indeed, the theoretical ambiguity about the phenomenon generates 
different visions of treatment in empirical studies. 
Moreover, some scholars as Pugliese et al. (2009) and Zona and Zattoni (2006) highlight that 
it is an emergent concept from the empirical literature and do not has a universal definition. In 
the next section, we propose to look for definitions of “involvement” and “job involvement” 
in social psychology and organizational behavior. 
1.2  About the concepts of “involvement” and “job involvement”  
The concept of involvement viewed by different fields
In  social  psychology  and  organizational  behavior  research,  the  use  of  the  concept  of 
involvement is more developed than in corporate governance. The concept was defined by 
many  authors;  we  refer  to  Antil  (1984)  study,  Barki  and  Hartwick  (1989)  and  François-
Philippe Boisserolles (2005) to deduct attributes of the concept. In the field of psychology, 
involvement has a meaning of personal importance to the individual (Antil, 1984). It is used 
to investigate attitudes, with various social issues. There are two key aspects of an issue: its 
importance and personal relevance (Barki and Hartwick, 1989).  
Barki and Hartwick explain that, empirically, this concept is related to the attitude change and 
its  translation  into  behavior.  Positive  or  negative  attitudes  are  readily  translated  into 
appropriate action. Thus, a greater attitude behavior corresponds to high involvement. 
The concept of job (or work) involvement
Barki  and  Hartwick  argue  that  in  the  organizational  behavior  fields,  the  concept  of 
involvement is always associated to job or work. They present three main definitions relevant 
to different fields of research. In psychology, the job involvement is seemed as the degree to 
which  a  person’s  work  performance  affects  his  or  her  self-esteem.  In  the  marketing  and 
consumer behavior field, a highly job involvement person is one for whom work is a very 
important  part  of  life.  For  the  organizational  behavior,  the  job  involvement  refers  to  the 
degree to participate in the job. Participative job behavior as making important job decisions 
and contributing to the organization’s goals are important indices of job involvement. We 
propose to adopt the last definition of involvement because it seems the nearest definition to 
previous studies on board involvement literature. 8
To  measure  the  degree  of  involvement,  specific  circumstances  that  exist  at  the  time  of 
measurement must be taken into consideration (Antil, 1984). Barki and Hartwick argue, also, 
that  sacking  of  conceptual  clarity  should  be  associated  with  antecedent  conditions  and 
subsequent effects. Thus, empirical test of the causes and effects of involvement should be 
carried out to better understand the extent and nature of involvement. In the organizational 
behavior, authors identify a number of antecedents and consequences of job involvement. For 
example,  it  is  viewed  as  a  result  of  early  socialization  of  individuals  and  current 
organizational  conditions  (antecedents),  and  it  may  affect  individual  and  organizational 
performance (results).  
Antil present the stimuli (source or cause of involvement) as a key to understand the level of 
involvement.  For  him,  Involvement  must  be  conceptualized  and  operationalized  as  a 
continuous  variable,  not  as  a  dichotomous  variable.  It  does  not  consist  of  two  mutually 
exclusive states ("high" and "low"). The inappropriate treatment of a continuous variable as 
dichotomous could cause, for him, problems and explain the divergence between results. 
François-Philip Boisserolles (2005, p. 121) present the job involvement as a cognitive and 
procedural phenomenon depending of level of performance at work and of central criteria as 
organization, relational quality, competences, etc. For the behavioral approach, it is viewed as 
a series of deliberate acts and considered as process, it is related to outside interests of the 
actions  in  the  search  for  cognitive  coherence  (Angle  and  Perry,  1981,  in  François-Philip 
Boisserolles, 2005). Many scholars highly recommended to measure involvement with Likert 
items  of  behaviors  and  activities  consistent  to  the  job  (Antil,  1984,  François-Philip 
Boisserolles, 2005; Barki and Hartwick, 1989).  
1.3 A synthetic definition of board Job involvement 
The phenomenon of involvement of board of directors is very complex. Neither the strategic 
nor the contractual approach of corporate governance does in itself explain the entire process 
(Charreaux, 2000; Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona; 2009). Pugliese et al. (2009) explain that it is 
a latent construct emerging from the literature, there is no single way to define or interpret it. 
For Forbes and Milliken (1999), it’s very difficult to measure the task performance of boards 
because  of  the  confidential  and  highly  interpretative  nature  of  board  activities.  They  also 
consider  it  as  a  latent  construct.  Pettigrew  (1992),  Rindova  (1999)  and  MacNulty  and 
Pettigrew (1999) argue that the content of board involvement can be only effectively analyzed 
through  its  link  with  the  process  of  strategy.    Board  involvement  is  the  ‘what’  and  the 
strategic process is the ‘how’ (Rindova, 1999). 9
Bases on these findings about board involvement and definitions of job involvement, we can 
summarize the criteria of this concept on:  
a) the process vision of the involvement that includes activities and behaviors of board 
members; 
b) the  importance  of  antecedents  (causes)  and  results  (effects)  to  understand  the 
phenomenon of involvement, its degrees and natures and 
c) the close relationship with the strategic process, area of board job involvement.  
Thus, we propose that board involvement in the strategic decision making process is a process 
of deliberate and anticipative actions. It refers to board formal and informal, individual and 
collective participation to a set of activities in the strategic process, which fall under their 
responsibility of strategic support, service and control.  
The  process  depends  on  external  circumstances  related  to  the  firm  and  environment 
characteristics and on internal factors related to the board demographic, cognitive, relational 
and  functioning  characteristics.  It  affects  organizational  results  as  strategic  decisions  and 
corporate performance.   
Because the strategic process represent the area of BD involvement, it is important to analyse 
its steps and how BD could participate in each of them. In the next paragraph, we attempt to 
analyse the articulation between BD roles and strategic process to deduct a set of strategic 
activities, as measure of BD job involvement.  
1.4  General set of board’s activities in the process of strategic decision making  
The strategic decision making process
The strategy is a complex and ambiguous concept difficult to assign a clear definition. It is 
implemented by strategic processes brought to finalized actions that allow creating-value and 
generate sustainable competitive advantages under certain conditions (Lorino and Tarondeau, 
2006).  Lorino  and  Tarondeau  defined  the  strategic  process  as  “a  set  of  finalized  actions, 
organized according to objectives or policies to change the conditions for integrating the firm 
in its environment [...] the processes are identifiable and observable, both in their results in 
basic activities that constitute them and the links established between them.”
Nevertheless, the process of decision making is complex and non-linear, depending on human 
behavior (Levy, Pliskin and Ravid, 2010). Pettigrew (1992, p. 171) highlight, also, that: “it is 10
characterized  as  one  of  great  complexity  and  uncertainty,  with  beliefs  and  experience 
performing crucial roles in filtering out ambiguity in the choice process”. Steps of the process 
are interactive and iterative rather than structured and sequential (Rindova, 1999). McNulty 
and Pettigrew (1999) explain that phases such as identification, developing and selection in 
the choice process are not necessarily following one another. 
In general, it includes all management functions from the definition of the general approach to 
performance  measurement  (Fayol,  1916  in  Karoui,  2009).  Thiétart  and  Xuered  (2005) 
distinguish between four main steps that are in continuous interaction: (1) Identification and 
selection  of  problems  (and/or  opportunities)  through  analysis  of  environment  and  internal 
resources of the company. (2) Identification and selection of strategic options (by analysis of 
the competitive position, identifying alternatives and setting goals of the action-plan steps.) 
(3)  Implementation  insured  essentially  by  CEO  and  his  collaborators,  (4)  Control  and 
evaluation. These steps  are identified in some  research about board of  directors,  as Huse 
(2007), Ruigrock et al. (2006) and Demb and Neubauer (1992). 
Interaction between Board roles and board activities during the strategic process
Board  roles:  The  contrast  between  contractual  and  strategic  board  theories  led  to  assign 
different roles at the board of directors. It is widely recognized that it has the following three 
functions: control, service and strategic support (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Charreaux, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 1996). First, based mainly on the agency theory (Jensen and Mekling, 1976 
and Fama 1983), the role of control was the subject of an abundant literature. The board of 
directors appears as an instrument of managers discipline (Charreaux, 2000). It is responsible 
for reducing agency costs and arbitrating the distribution of the created value. In practice, the 
Board has the responsibility to appoint and dismiss the CEO. It is responsible for evaluating 
management  performance,  organizational  performance  and  corporate  accounts  as  well  as 
control  of  strategic  implementation.  Second,  the  service  role  consists  mainly  to  help  the 
company  to  acquire  external  resources,  which  are  scarce  and  essential  for  its  business. 
According to the resource dependency perspective, board of directors facilitates access to 
these resources and enables the cooptation of the company with its environment (Pfeffer, 
1972  and  1973,  Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978).  In  addition,  this  role  is  associated  with  the 
leadership council at strategic implementation, the resolution of emerging problems and the 
management  of  company  image.  The  board,  indeed,  represents  the  company  in  its 
environment. Finally, the strategic role is the most complex and less explored empirically 11
(Rouigrok  et  al.,  2006).  In  the  framework  of  the  cognitive  approach  and  strategic  choice 
perspective, board of directors is  responsible for the strategic decision making  (Andrews, 
1980, Forbes and Milliken, 1999). It participates actively in the steps of the strategic process, 
as analysis, interpretation and choice of strategic options (Rindova, 1999). 
Interaction  between  board  roles:  The  review  of  literature  about  board  roles  reveals  its 
interaction  and  interdependence  during  the  steps  of  the  strategic  process.      Lorsch  and 
MacIver  (1989,  p.  66-67)  argued  that  the  role  of  adviser  and  counselor  is  linked  to  the 
strategic role of board members. Directors, in the reality, do not distingue between these two 
functions. They consider them related to the same responsibility of determining the company 
policy. Rindova (1999) explained that strategic control requires a thorough understanding of 
corporate strategy and involvement in the formulation step. That may lead to an effective 
strategic advice on the one hand, and an effective strategic control and aid in problem solving 
within  the  strategic  implementation,  on  the  other  hand.  Thus,  according  to  him  and  to 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), directors are provided with substantial expertise in analyzing 
and  solving  problems  through  their  past  professional  experiences.  They  can  make  their 
cognitive contributions to serve management not only in strategic formulation but also in the 
strategic  implementation.  It  is  through  this  contribution  that  they  can  evaluate  CEO 
performance and therefore intervene when it is necessary. 
Set of board activities to measure board involvement in the strategic decision making process  
In  the  next  table,  we  propose  a  set  of  board  activities  that  belong  to  its  different  roles 
(strategy, control and service). Board members have the responsibility to participate in these 
activities during the process of strategic decision making. The degree of its involvement in 
each activity could be measured by likert scale (Antil, 1984; Barki and Hartwick, 1989).  12
Table 2 - Set of board activities in the steps of the strategic decision making process 
Steps of the 
strategic process 
Board activities 
(Board involvement in…) 
Board roles  Main references 
1.Setting (initiating and discussing) major 






2. Keep watch on competitive, economic, 








4.Analyzing and evaluating the  corporate 







analysis of the 
company and its 
environment 
5.Identification of opportunities and 
problems that the company could  avail 






6.Identification of options (solutions) for 
retained opportunities and problems 
Strategy   Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) 
7.Analysis of the competitive position of 
the company vis-à-vis  the retained 
problem/opportunity 
Strategy   McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999 
8. Evaluation of management’s proposals 
and/or propositions of alternative options 
(advantages and disadvantages, etc.) 
Strategy   McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999 
9.Evaluation of the financial impact of 
alternative and retained options 





10.Consolidating  the options (discussion 
and making final choice) 
Strategy  McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) 
11.Review and approve corporate plan of 
implementation and actions (main steps 
and setting objectives and indicators to 
monitor the implementation progress) 
Strategy + 
control 
Lorch and MacIver 
(1989) 





13.Intermediation with important external  
actors to facilitate the implementation  
Service  Pfeffer 
(1972,1973) 





MacIver (1989),  
15.Identification of solutions for the 
emergent problems of management 
Service  Pettigrew (1992) 
Strategic 
implementation 
16.Facilitate (intermediation in) acquiring 
resources (financial, cognitive or 
technological resources) 
Service  Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978 






18. Financial monitoring (control by 
results, accounts, budget, etc.) 
Control   Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) 
19.Monitoring the performance of the 
company via financial and strategic 
measures  
Control   Fama and Jensen 
(1983) 
20.Evaluation of management performance  Control   Fama and Jensen 




21.The process of appointment or 
revocation of the CEO and controlling 
compensation  
Control   Lorch and MacIver 
(1989) 13
2 Literature on board involvement in the strategic decision making process 
(board job involvement) 
In  this  section,  our  objective  is  to  discuss  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  about  the 
phenomena of board job involvement as presented in the past section.  
Literature  on  BD  is  characterized  by  theoretical  pluralism  and  empirical  lack  of 
conclusiveness.  First,  we  attempt  to  distinguee  theories  that  has  better  analysed  board 
involvement in strategic process from others. Second, we analyse different visions adopted by 
empirical researches to investigate the subject. These elements are important to deduct the 
determinants factors and effects of BD involvement for an operational model.  
2.1 Theoretical debate 
The theoretical pluralism on board research is highlighted by several studies since the end of 
80s such as Zahra and Pearce (1989), Stiles and Taylor (2001), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), 
Pugliese et al. (2009) etc. Lorch and MacIver (1989, p. 8) argued that the question of board’s 
activities  and  decisions  compared  to  those  of  management  was  the  controversial  point 
between  managers  and  directors.  Thus,  there  is  no  convergence  between  the  different 
theoretical  conceptions  of  board  functions  (Huat  Ong  and  Hoon  Lee,  2000).  Studying  a 
review of board theories allow one to distinguish between the theories of the  contractual 
approach and theories of the strategic approach (Charreaux, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). Each of 
these approaches has a different view of board’s roles. The contractual approach has a limited 
vision of board activities and do not recognize its strategic involvement unless the strategic 
control. The strategic approach argues for more board involvement in service and strategic 
activities. In this approach, some theories (as dependence and stewardship theories) defend 
board strategic involvement without description of its activities in the strategic process. Some 
others (as cognitive and strategic choice perspectives) defend board participation in strategic 
processes as formulation, planning, etc. Below, we present these three visions. 
2.1.1 The contractual approach 
The  contractual  vision  perceives  the  firm  as  a  nexus  of  contracts  based  on  an  agency 
relationship between top managers and shareholders (the agency theory) or other stakeholders 
(the stakeholder theory). The similarity between contractual theories is their vision of board 
functions:  all  of  them  recognize  its  limited  involvement  in  the  firm  life  and  in  corporate 14
strategy. We find in this approach agency  and  transaction costs theories, class hegemony 
perspective, legalistic perspective and stakeholder theory. 
The agency theory is the dominant perspective on the corporate governance research. While 
managers are wholly responsible for the decisions of the firms, the role of board of directors is 
limited to the strategic control and managers monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) in order to reduce agency costs and to protect shareholders interest by 
maximizing shareholder’s value. The transaction-cost theory is generally associated to the 
agency theory because of similarities between the two, particularly with regards to the board 
of directors’ role. In fact, the transaction-cost theory considers top managers opportunistic 
who  do  not  act  in  the  interest  of  their  enterprise.  The  board  of  directors  is,  indeed,  an 
instrument to control managers (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, p.15).  
Despite  of  its  recognition  of  the  control  function  of  boards,  the  theory  of  managerial 
hegemony describes board of directors as passive and fictive legal organism because it does 
not  assume  its  responsibilities.  The  management  takes  the  entire  responsibility  for  the 
strategic  establishing  and  the  organizational  control  (Mace,  1971).  Both  of  managerial 
hegemony  and  agency  theories  concentrate  on  the  board's  relationship  to  corporate 
management.  They  assume  the  importance  of  the  corporate  control  to  reduce  conflicts  of 
interest between corporate managers and shareholders (Kosnik, 1987). 
In  the  legalistic  vision,  boards  are  responsible  for  executive  hiring,  dismissal  and 
compensation (Chaganty, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985). This legal measure helps board to 
monitor  the  management  activities  and  to  protect  shareholders  interests.  Regarding  the 
stakeholder’s perspective, a board provides for arbitration of the rent distribution between 
stakeholders  (Charreaux  and  Debrieres,  1998;  Charreaux,  2000).  This  vision  takes  into 
consideration the notion of skills to explain the involvement of stakeholders (including board 
of directors) in the value creation. However, it does not explain the origin of knowledge and 
distinctive skills that underpin the strategies for creating value. 
Despite to the dominance of these theories in governance research (especially the agency 
theory), they suffered from several limitations in explaining the board of directors’ roles. For 
example,  all  of  these  theories  do  not  recognize  the  contribution  of  board  in  formulating 
strategic decisions, ignore the influence of board dynamics and reduce its composition to 
demographic characteristics.  15
2.1.2 The strategic approach 
The strategic and cognitive theories are interested in the strategic dimension of value creation, 
particularly in the role of the board in creating new strategic opportunities of development 
(Charreaux, 2002a, 2002b). Thus, the company is considered as a directory of key skills. The 
analysis of value creation must be understood not only in terms of agency costs but also in 
terms of organizational learning and developing new opportunities. Board composition and 
roles  are  interpreted  differently  than  in  the  contractual  approach.  For  example,  board 
composition should be based on knowledge and skills diversity and not only on the distinction 
between internal and external members. Board roles are expanded to participating in strategy 
by advice, counsel and cognitive contribution (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; 
Charreaux, 2000; Godard, 2006). 
In  the  context  of  board  involvement  in  the  strategic  decision  making  process,  strategic 
theories  can  be  divided  in  two  groups.  The  first  group  of  stewardship  and  resources 
dependence theories defend BD strategic role (service and collaboration). However, they do 
not focus on board activities and behavior. The second group of strategic choice and cognitive 
perspectives has analyzed board behavior and participation in a set of strategic activities. This 
second group with some recent frameworks based on complementarity between BD theories 
present, in our opinion, a better analysis of BD involvement in the strategic process. 
Stewardship and resources dependence theories 
Stewardship theory rejects agency assumptions especially about manager’s opportunism. For 
stewardship authors, managers perceive that serving organization interests is also in their own 
interests. Thus, the duality of functions (combining chairman and chief executive) may have a 
positive effect on management effectiveness and on organizational returns. In this way, board 
should assure the stewardship of  firm assets (Donaldson and  Davis, 1991; Davis and al., 
1997). 
The resource dependence theory is a strategic contingency theory developed by Pfeffer (1972, 
1973).  It  attributes  to  the  board  of  directors  a  strategic  role  of  cooptation  with  external 
environment  to  secure  critical  resources,  to  reinforce  organizational  legitimacy  and  to 
preserve  the  image  of  the  company.  To  realize  these  objectives,  authors  highlight  the 
importance of some demographic characteristics, especially board diversity and size. Board 16
composition  is  considered  as  organizational  response  to  the  conditions  of  the  external 
environment (i.e. the theory is used to explain the importance of ‘interlocking directorates’ to 
reduce environmental uncertainty resulting from dependency on external organizations and 
actors, Stiles and Taylor, 2001, p. 17). 
In short, this group of theories focuses on board interlocking, contingencies and service role 
that might affect board effectiveness and corporate performance. However, they present some 
limits. In the stewardship vision, the board of directors is the steward of stakeholder’s interest, 
but  there  is  a  lack  of  details  about  board  activities  and  how  they  make  decisions.  The 
dependence theory focuses on the board service role of linking with external environment but 
not in its internal process of work and decision making. Moreover, a number of authors argues 
that these theories can be valid for some board phenomena (situations) but not for others 
(Charreaux, 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Stiles and Taylor, 2001, etc.). They propose, 
indeed, a pluralistic methodology based on complementarity between agency and stewardship 
theories. 
Strategic choice perspective and cognitive perspective 
The strategic choice perspective was developed in the 70s and become the theoretical support 
of many studies on the corporate governance and board of directors. Child (1972) proposed a 
theoretical model based on the concept of ‘strategic choice’. Depending on environmental 
complexity and uncertainty, decision-makers follow a prior process of perception, evaluation 
and analyzing opportunities and  constraints before making strategic choices. This process 
depends  on  their  values,  perceptions,  skills  and  on  environmental  information  deposed. 
Strategy is the first link between the company and its environment; a well planned strategy 
enhances company performance and organizational outcomes.  
To have better strategic decisions, board members can participate actively in many activities 
related to strategy formulation and evaluation (Zahra, 1990). Huat Ong and Hoon-Lee (2000) 
present  a  set  of  strategic  activities  undertaken  by  board:  scanning  the  environment  for 
information, procuring assets, planning, implementing and evaluating strategic measures for 
divestments, acquisitions, R&D, expenditures and capital expenditures (p. 14). Boards are 
considered in the best place to contribute effectively in the strategic formulation (Andrews, 
1980, 1981a and 1981b) for many reasons. First, they serve the link with the environment; 
indeed, they have resources to collect information about environmental changes, competitivity 17
and main external actors. Second, directors who are executives in other organizations have 
important professional experience in strategic decision making process. Then, the complexity 
and uncertainty of the strategic process requires the involvement of directors to provide inputs 
as information, competence and guidance (mentoring) to managers in their strategic actions 
(Huat Ong and Hoon Lee, 2000). Boards can support management imagination, overview the 
innovative processes and stimulate creativity. They emphasize and contribute to the search for 
new  opportunities  and  alternatives  (Andrews,  1980).  Zahra  (1990)  proposes  a  mutual 
collaboration  between  board  members  and  the  CEO  in  strategic  formulation  and 
implementation,  which  still  under  the  direct  responsibility  of  CEO.  In  this  way,  board 
members  could  be  involved  in  taking  general  analysis  of  the  organizational  environment, 
considering strategic alternatives and checking strategic plans. 
An effective participation in the strategic process allows having more effective mangers by 
board  advising,  checking  and  supporting  (Hambrick  and  Mason,  1984),  setting  better 
strategies and, in consequence, carrying higher levels of long term corporate performance 
(Andrews, 1981b – p. 174). 
The cognitive perspective was developed by the end of the 90s with three principals studies: 
Rindova (1999), McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) and Forbes and Milliken (1999). 
Rindova (1999) proposed a new theoretical framework studying directors’ cognition and its 
effect on the strategy establishment. It suggests that directors have an important cognitive 
contribution in the strategic decision making process. This vision controvert past assumptions 
about the limited contribution of boards in strategy because of their lack of independence and 
firm specific knowledge. In the cognitive framework, directors are presented as experts with 
specific knowledge (about the firm and its activities), general knowledge (in strategy, finance, 
law, etc.), professional experience and expertise in strategic problem solving developed in 
their past experience. These characteristics represent a crucial cognitive input to strategic and 
cognitive activities as scanning, interpretation and choice (steps of strategic decision making). 
They  contribute,  indeed,  to  dealing  with  the  complexity  and  uncertainty  of  the  strategic 
process (p. 954).  
The originality of McNulty and Pettigrew framework is to propose a detailed set of board 
behaviors in the strategic process not identified in previous studies. They had examined board 
contribution in strategy and developed a conceptual model illustrating how board members 18
are able to influence strategic process. Strategy, in their framework, can be established via 
three key aspects (processes): choice, change and control. The board of directors could reach 
three level of involvement in strategy: ‘taking decision’, ‘shaping decisions’ and ‘shaping the 
content, context and conduct of strategy’. The difference between levels is identified by board 
participation  or  non-participation  in  some  strategic  activities  of  the  process,  and  also,  by 
dialogue and social interaction between board members. They suggest that strategy is a sphere 
of  activities  in  which  board  members  can  assume  many  activities.  By  taking  strategic 
decisions,  board  members  may  ratify,  reject  or  ask  to  modify  executive  proposals.  They 
consider this lowest level of involvement as exercising control over management (by making 
strategic choice). The second level of involvement consider directors behavior before taking 
final decision, especially by discussing and influencing executive strategic thinking before 
making strategic proposals. Finally, for the last level of involvement, board members could 
influence  the  conditions  of  the  strategic  process.  They  attempt  to  insure  the  strategic 
formulation.  This  level  is  appropriate  to  emergent  strategy  that  can  be  formed  in  an 
organization  without  being  consciously  intended.  Board  members  could  create  climate  of 
strategic thinking for developing strategy. Authors mentioned the importance of inner and 
outer  context  of  the  company  that  may  affect  the  conduct  of  the  board  and  its  level  of 
involvement. 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) developed a framework about board process and dynamics to 
explain the link between board demographic characteristics and corporate performance. They 
propose a model of strategic decision making effectiveness. They consider board as a decision 
making  group  defined  as  “intact  social  system  that  perform  one  or  more  tasks  within  an 
organizational context” (p. 491). The effectiveness of boards depends on three conditions: (1) 
the group participation and interaction -i.e. effort norms-, (2) the exchange of information and 
critical discussion –i.e. cognitive conflict-, (3) the presence and use of knowledge and skills –
i.e. functional skills and firm-specific knowledge-. 
An effective board can perform two outcomes which contribute to the firm performance: task 
performance and cohesiveness. Task performance or task effectiveness requires deliberation, 
communication and engagement and trust in their judgment and expertise. It is important to 
have  high  level  of  expertise,  experience  and  knowledge,  and  to  apply  them  to  its  tasks. 
Cohesiveness (interpersonal-attraction) and cognitive conflict are also important to have an 
effective participation of board of directors in the decision-making process. However, they 
explain  that  high  level  of  cohesiveness  can  result  a  group-think  phenomenon  which  can 19
reduce the critical thinking and have a negative effect on decision making process. Thus, as a 
response to this risk, authors suggest that the task oriented disagreement; debate and cognitive 
conflict with a minimum level of cohesiveness are both important for a good functioning of 
the strategic process. 
In a further examination of board’s role in strategy, Stiles and Taylor (2001) highlighted the 
importance  of  reviewing  strategic  initiatives  as  a  central  feature  of  board  members 
contribution, and the importance of the presence of non-executive directors for the quality of 
strategic proposals and the effectiveness of decision-making. To Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005),  the  involvement  and  engagement  of  non-executives  means  that  they  can  both 
contribute directly to the quality of executive decision-making and ensure that any weakness 
in the executive will quickly become visible to the non-executives. Carpenter and Westphal 
(2001) has examined the impact of external network ties on board contribution in the strategic 
decision making process. They developed the socio-cognitive perspective which suggests “the 
importance of directors’ networks of appointments to other boards in determining whether 
they  have  the  appropriate  strategic  knowledge  and  perspective  to  monitor  and  advice 
management in the strategic decision making process” (p 640). They argue that directors’ 
experience  in  other  boards  provides  an  important  source  of  information  about  business 
practices 
Emergence of complementary frameworks 
Last  years are marked  by the search for  alternative theoretical foundations of the  agency 
theory  to  explain  board  effectiveness.  Corley  (2005)  highlights  the  particularity  of  some 
studies as Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), Huse (2005) and Pye and Pettigrew (2005) to 
propose  framework  with  intermediate  strategic  steps  between  board  characteristics  and 
corporate performance. These propositions are consistent with cognitive and strategic choice 
findings. In fact, Huse (2005) proposes a theoretical framework about the accountability of 
the board of directors via a behavioral perspective. He supports the suggestion of Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) about creating accountability to bridge the  difference between 
board  role  expectations  in  theory  and  real  board  task  performance.  This  framework  is  a 
response for the need to an alternative framework to the input-output model which dominates 
corporate governance research for more than two decades (example: relation between board 
characteristics and corporate performance).  20
Thus, the framework consists to elaborate intermediate steps between board composition and 
corporate  financial  performance.  He  displayed  in  the  framework  three  factors  which  may 
increase board accountability: (1) board’s decision-making culture, (2) formal and informal 
structures and norms, (3) the interaction inside and outside the boardroom (p. 72). As argued 
by Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), Huse consider the 
board’s decision-making culture the most important factor for creating accountability (p. 72). 
This large notion can be related to cognitive conflicts, commitment, consensus, creativity, etc. 
As in the theory of the firm, explaining roles of the Board is not immune from the tendency to 
use the complementarity between opposing theories to better explain the phenomenon. Some 
authors consider the complementarity between board theories and highlight the importance of 
integrative model to explain board activities. For example, Bammens, Voodeckers and Van 
Gils  (2011)  identify  complementarities  between  agency  theory,  stewardship  theory  and 
stakeholder theory to analyze board roles (advice and control) in family businesses.  
Ravasi  and  Zattoni  (2006)  have  explored  a  political  perspective  of  board  involvement  in 
strategy based on a mixed conceptual funding (strategic choice and agency theory). They 
argue  that  heterogeneity  of  interest  between  actors  (shareholders,  directors  and  mangers) 
increase board involvement in strategic activities. In reference to Mintzberg classification of 
decision  making  patterns  (judgment,  analysis  and  bargaining),  they  conclude  that  in  the 
presence of high heterogeneity  of interests, board tends to rely  more on bargaining. This 
conclusion is applicable to companies without a majority of shareholders who control. 
In the following table,  we summarize theoretical findings about board contribution in the 
corporate governance research.  21
Table 3 - Synthesis of board of directors’ contributions in the corporate governance theories 
CONTRACTUAL THEORIES STRATEGIC AND COGNITIVE THEORIES
MAIN IDEAS: -the firm is a nexus of contracts 
based on an agency relationship between top 
managers and shareholders/stakeholders.  
-Board of directors has a little contribution in the 
firm life, monitoring role without participation in 
initiating strategy.
MAIN IDEAS: -the firm is a directory of key skills. 
Knowledge has a capital role in the creating value.  
-Board has an important role in establishing the 
corporate strategy. 
Theory / Discipline  Board contribution  Theory / Discipline  Board contribution 
T: Legalistic 
approach 
D: Corporate Law 
(Chaganti et al., 
1985, etc.) 
Nominating CEO and 
monitoring his 
performance; evaluating 
company performance and 
representing shareholders’ 
interest 
T: Resource dependence 
theory (& social 
networks theory) 
D: Organizational 
theory & Sociology 
(Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; 





participates to insure 
critical resources, 
legitimacy and reputation 
of the company.   
T: Agency theory 
(and transaction-
cost theory) 
D: Economics & 
Finance




managers and owners. It 
contributes on strategic 
control and monitoring 
managers’ effectiveness.
T: Stewardship theory  
D: Theories of 
organizations 
(Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Davis and al., 
1997) 
Managers are not only 
opportunistic agents. 
They are also good 
stewards of company 
assets. 
Board should assure the 
stewardship of firm 
assets 
It participates in the 









Board provides the link 
between managers and 
other stakeholders 
(managers, employees, 
etc.), and insure 
arbitration of value 
creation. 
T: Class Hegemony 
D: Sociology (Mills, 
1965, in Zahra et Pearce, 
1989) 
Board represents 
capitalist elites over 
social and economic 
institutions. This theory 
has not explained board 




D: theories of 
organizations 
(Mace, 1971; Lorsch 
and McIver, 1989)
Board members don’t 
participate to establish the 
corporate strategy because 
of their low availability 
and low commitment. The 
real running of the 
organization is assumed 
by corporate management. 
T: Cognitive perspective 
(and strategic choice) 
D: cognitive psychology 
(Child, 1972; Rindova, 
1999, etc.) 
Board of directors is a 
capital actor in the 
strategy setting. 
It participate actively in 
all steps of the strategic 
decision making process. 
The knowledge and 
experience of directors 
are crucial for board 
efficiency. 
2.2 Empirical debate 
The phenomenon of board involvement in the strategic process is complex. An empirical 
investigation requires analysing antecedent factors that could affect the nature and extent of 22
BD involvement, and effects that allow evaluating the efficiency of BD involvement. Thus, 
we propose in this section to distinguish between three empirical visions. The first focuses on 
the board participation in the strategic process. The second focuses on determinants of board 
involvement. The third focus on the effect of board job involvement on organizational outputs 
(especially strategic decisions).  
2.2.1 Board involvement in the strategic decision making process 
The majority of empirical studies found general support for the cognitive perspective and the 
strategic choice theory. However, there are some studies that are against board participation in 
strategy.  The  next  two  paragraphs  will  present  empirical  findings  against  and  for  board 
involvement. 
Against board involvement in the strategic decision making process
In the Managerial hegemony finding, Mace (1971) demonstrated empirically on a sample of 
US boards, that the board of directors has a minimum participation in the organizational life : 
it  don’t    participate  neither  in  strategic  decision  making  nor  in  monitoring  managers  and 
organizational  performance.  It  is  presented  as  fictive  legal  organ.  Board,  in  effect,  has  a 
minimum  participation  in  the  control  of  management  because  directors  are  selected  by 
executives  (CEO),  indeed,  they  are  not  able  to  ask  him  to  resign  in  the  case  of  lack  of 
performance. Also, board does not participate in establishing decisions, objectives or asking 
discerning questions.   In this vision, management has the total responsibility for business 
running,  controlling  and  establishing  (Stiles  and  Taylor,  2001).  In  consequence,  the 
managerial domination has greatly limited the role of board of directors, unless undergoing a 
situation of crisis.  
Kosnik (1987) supported the managerial hegemony theories about the fictive role of the board 
of  directors.  The  purpose  of  his  paper  was  to  identify  board  characteristics  to  be  more 
effective on decision making. He defined board's ineffectiveness as the inability of outside 
directors to prevent management from making decisions that are in conflict with stockholders' 
interests. Using the “greenmail” as measure of board ineffectiveness, he selected 53 boards 
identified as having allowed greenmail and a set of 57 boards identified as having resisted 
paying greenmail under the same circumstances (in the period 1979 – 1983). He found that 
boards with more outsider directors who have executive experience and contractual interest 
with the company could be more effective in their decision making.  23
Moreover, other studies found that if board becomes involved in strategy, it might destroy 
value. For example, Jensen (1993, p. 850-857) argued that board of directors failed to cause 
managers  to  maximize  efficiency  and  value.  The  job  of  the  board  is  to  hire,  fire,  and 
compensate the CEO, and to provide high level counsel. However, board members react too 
late, and are reluctant to change decision unless in crisis cases. He explained this failure by 
two reasons: (1) board culture (the CEO has the power to control the board which can reduce 
the CEO and company’s performance) and (2) information problems (The CEO determines 
the agenda and information given to the board). Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006) analysed the 
reasons of mergers by investigating synergies and internal agency conflicts. In their model, 
they supposed board of directors deciding merger of  company’s divisions. After that, the 
divisional managers made their entrenchment choice that depends on the specificity of the 
division’s  assets.  Authors  concluded  that  board  of  directors’  mergers  decision  doesn’t 
participate to ameliorate the firm value (cash flow).  “… It may be possible that by the careful 
design of incentive contracts, the board of directors may reduce or even completely eliminate 
enrichment activities (p. 571)”. 
For more board involvement in the strategic decision making process
Empirical studies defending BD involvement in strategy emerged slowly and still rare until 
the beginning of the 90s. Remarkable studies in this tradition are Andrews (1980), Tashakori 
and Boulton (1983), Lorsch and MacIver (1989), Judge and Zeithaml (1992) and Demb and 
Neubeuer (1992). Almost of them adopted qualitative methods (by conducting interviews or 
combining interviews and questionnaires addressed to CEOs and directors). Big American 
companies had the exclusive attention of these studies. All of them apply for more board 
participation in strategy and justify empirically BD involvement in many strategic activities. 
Then, the end of 90s was marked by the emergence of the cognitive perspective (Rindova, 
1999; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). After that and because of 
some events (as corporate governance scandals), the number of empirical studies increased. 
They focus not only on board activities in the strategic process but also on the determinant 
factors  that  influence  the  degree  and  efficacy  of  BD  involvement.  Samples  of  companies 
include different countries (not only US) and some analyses adopt international comparisons. 
Empirical methods are varied between qualitative quantitative and triangulation.  
Empirical results The work of Andrews (1980) was from the first researches that conducted 
interviews  with  many  US  CEO  and  directors  to  justify  the  desirability  of  more  board 
involvement  in  strategy  development.  He  found  that  BD  engagement  in  the  design  and 24
execution  of  corporate  strategy  could  have  a  good  influence  in  long-term  company’s 
performance. Tashakori and Boulton (1983) confirm the idea and found the increasing of 
board involvement in the planning process of strategy. They conclude that this participation 
has  a  positive  effect  on  information  availability  and  on  performance  evaluation.  In  1989, 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989, p. 66-74) conducted a comprehensive empirical study combining 
case studies and questionnaire distributed to 1100 directors. They conclude the importance of 
full-board involvement in the strategic planning and formulation. They argued that the reality 
of board functioning is different from its legal responsibilities limited to control i.e. - it has 
other  important  (but  less  talked-of)  strategic  responsibilities-.  They  encouraged  to  have  a 
strategic committee and to devote more time to review and discuss corporate strategy, also to 
provide outside directors with more time and information to consider complex matters. As 
affirmed by the resource dependency perspective, board of directors represents the image of 
the company in its environment. Thus, they have the responsibility, in making decision, for 
assuring that the corporation affair are conducted in an ethical, legal and socially responsible 
fashion (p.70).
Bases  on  these  ideas  and  the  strategic  choice  perspective,  Judge  and  Zeithaml  (1992) 
considered in their empirical investigation BD members as major actors of decision making 
and developed an empirical analysis of why and how boards get involved in the strategic 
decision process (p 767). However, they simplified the representation of the strategic process 
on two steps formulation and implementation. They explored personal interviews with 114 
board members of 42 organizations. Board involvement was measured by the average of the 
involvement intensity score across the board members responses within each organization. 
They  found  that  board  involvement  has  a  positive  effect  on  financial  performance.  It  is 
positively  correlated  to  firm  size  and  negatively  related  to  board  size  and  the  level  of 
diversification and insiders. In the same year, Demb and Neubeuer (1992) conducted a similar 
study with more detailed steps of the strategic process and a strong empirical investigation 
combining interviews and questionnaire. In fact, they interviewed 71 directors of 11 large US 
companies  and  explored  137  questionnaires  distributed  to  their  board  members.  They 
considered five stages of strategy  development: initiating and setting vision, analyzing of 
options,  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation.  Depending  on  the  degree  of  board 
participation, they proposed three modes of board involvement: Watchdog, Trustee and Pilot. 
In the watchdog mode, board members are involved in the monitoring and evaluation stages 
of the process, in a post factum mode. The Trustee or the ‘guardian of assets’ is responsible 25
for enhancing corporate activities and for evaluating the conduct of business. So, it plays a 
limited role in the initiation and implementation of strategy, but substantially involved in 
analyzing options, monitoring and evaluating results. The pilot board has an active role on 
directing the  corporate  policy  and conduct of the company. So, it participates actively in 
formulating  and  perhaps  initiating  strategy  (p.  55).  To  explore  the  differences  between 
executives and non executives in taking strategic decisions, Hill (1995) conducted interviews 
with  42  directors  of  11  UK  companies.  He  found  that  non-executives  in  UK  boards  are 
involved  in  reviewing  and  refining  the  strategic  decisions  of  their  organizations.  Top 
managers want to be seen as good professionals, indeed, the difference of interests between 
shareholders and mangers is low. Thus, both executives and non executives have key roles in 
bringing strategic vision, scanning environment and taking decisions.  
Last years are marked by the developing of new frameworks to investigate empirically BD 
involvement in strategy. From the main works, we find Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) 
which  propose  a  new  framework  based  in  the  notion  of  ‘creating  accountability’.  They 
interviewed 40 company directors commissioned for the Higgs Review, and concluded the 
lack understanding of the process and behavior of board of directors in strategy. The classic 
distinction  between  control  and  collaboration  do  not  refer  to  board  activity  in  their  lived 
experience.  Accountability  refers  to  a  variety  of  director’s  behavior  like  discussing, 
informing, testing, exploring and encouraging (p. S6).  Both control and strategic aspects of 
the role can be achieved through strong and rigorous processes of accountability within the 
board.  They  suggest  three  linked  sets  of  behaviors  of  non-executives:  engaged  but  non-
executive; challenging but supportive and independent but involved (p. 12). 
In short, BD involvement is a complex phenomenon, indeed, to evaluate its degrees, it is 
important  to  analyse  the  influence  of  its  determinant  factors.  Pye  and  Pettigrew  (2005) 
consider board of directors’ decision-making as vital to the organization, especially because 
they meet only few times in the year to discuss for important decisions (p. S33). It is difficult 
to  describe  generic  characteristics  of  effective  board  because  there  are  many  contingency 
factors which influence board process (p. S35). Thus, the complement of many elements from 
different levels of analysis and factors could reflect board process of creating outcomes (P. 
36). It is important, in consequence, to find integrative level of analysis of structure and action 
links at micro and macro levels simultaneously.  26
2.2.2 Determinants of board involvement in the decision making process 
Literature present different visions of factors that could affect board involvement in strategy. 
In a cognitive analysis, board involvement in strategy is determined by dynamic interactive 
effects,  indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  the  determinants  of  this  involvement  (Minichilli, 
Zattoni and Zona, 2009; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). Minichilli , Zattoni and Zona (2009) find 
that board demographic characteristics ( board size, independence, duality and shareholding) 
have a limited power to explain board task performance (a lack of clear relationship between 
board  characteristics  and  different  board  tasks,  p.  70).  However,  cognitive  factors 
(commitment and cognitive conflicts) are more powerful to explain board task performance. 
By commitment, authors refer to board preparation before meetings and board discussion on 
critical questions (p. 68). Cognitive conflicts refer to cognitive disagreements on the firm 
goals  and  debate  to  reach  a  strategic  consensus.  The  authors  suggest  having  an  active 
nomination committee, which should select board members in order to secure a balance of 
skills needed by the company (P. 69). They show also the influence of context (firm size, 
industry) on board task performance. All these factors can make pressure on board members 
to perform their tasks.  
Pye and Pettigrew (2005) distinguee the inner factors from the outer contextual factors. They 
propose  five  important  aspects  of  the  external  context  (regulation,  ownership  structure, 
influential stakeholders, potential mergers and acquisitions activity and the overall perceived 
level of risk to the organization) (p. S31). From inner factors, they propose the commercial 
requirement of the firm to develop new strategic directions or competencies, the level of 
perceived  trust  in  the  board  and  life  cycle  of  the  company.  These  factors  may  influence 
positively  or  negatively  the  conduct  and  behavior  of  boards.  As  a  main  organizational 
decision-making group, board effectiveness might be described on a board level way more 
than  individually  (p.  S32).  Moreover,  it  is  important  to  have  suitable  knowledge  and 
information to contribute meaningfully to strategy (Carptenter and Westphal, 2001, p. 640). 
Zona and Zattoni (2006) tested the impact of information diversity (static dimension of board 
capital)  and  the  using  of  diverse  information  (dynamic  dimension  measured  by  open 
discussion, effective leadership and active search) on the quality of strategic decision making 
behavior of directors. Recently, Balta, Woods and Dickson (2010) have examined the effect 
of educational level, educational specialty and functional background of board members on 
two decision making processes (Hierarchical decentralization and financial reporting). They 
found that educational level affect both of these processes.27
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) have developed a framework about ‘board capital’ referring to 
Human  capital  (directors’  competences,  collective  expertises  and  experiences)  and 
networking capital.  Zhang (2010) proposed to extent the analysis of board capital by adding 
the use of diverse information as a dynamic dimension of board behavior. They examined 
empirically how these dimensions affect board task performance and found that using diverse 
information  (as  discussion,  active  search)  has  a  stronger  influence  on  the  board  current 
strategic task performance than possessing diverse information (p. 474). However, possessing 
diverse information has a significant influence on both current and future tasks performance. 
The author considers maintaining diverse information as key for decision making quality. The 
diversity  of  information  requires  information  exchange.  If  exchanging  isn’t  properly 
managed,  it  can  incur  biases  and  reduce  decision  making  quality  (p.  475).  So  for  him, 
directors are expected to provoke strategically different views and raise discerning questions 
and it is even recommended that they should engage in task related fight rather than reaching 
consensus (p. 475). In this way, board are more beneficial to their firm rather than reaching a 
rapid consensus because it can incur group thinking and reduce the quality of the decision 
making.  
2.2.3 Effects of board job involvement 
Since the recommendation of Hambrick and Mason (1984) to focus on top management team 
characteristics and behavior in future research, many studies have emerged to identify the link 
between demographic characteristics of top management team and organizational outcomes 
such as corporate performance, strategic change, innovation, diversification etc. In general, 
organizational outcomes are considered as reflection of the values and cognitive bases of top 
management team of the organization (Pettigrew, 1992, p. 173).  
In the corporate governance research, a particular line of studies has focused on the effect of 
board  in  some  outcomes  of  decision  processes.  It  studied  the  relation  between  board 
demographic characteristics and some firms’ organizational results (Deutsch, 2005). This line 
of research characterized by studying the relation Input-Output represents the main orientation 
of empirical corporate governance research. On the one hand, abundant research has focused 
in  identifying  the  systematic  relationship  between  board  composition  and  firm  corporate 
performance (Charreaux, 2000; Karoui, 2009; Pugliese et al., 2009; Minichilli, Zattoni and 
Zona, 2009). On the other hand, some studies have examined the impact of board composition 
on strategic decisions (Westphal and Frederickson, 2001; Deutsh, 2005; Ravasi and Zattoni, 
2006). 28
The  agency  theory  was  the  theoretical  support  of  almost  these  studies.  Board  members, 
particularly  independent  members,  are  the  guarantors  of  shareholders’  interest  from 
opportunistic  behavior  of  executive  managers  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983).  Therefore,  many 
studies investigated how board demographic characteristics (composition and structure) are 
related to the content of corporate strategies (Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; Pugliese et al., 2009). 
In  a  meta-analysis  of  38  empirical  studies,  Deutsch  (2005)  has  identified  seven  critical 
corporate  decisions  (CEOs’  total  compensation  and  incentive  pay,  diversification,  R&D 
expenditure, debt intensity, takeover defenses and CEO turnover). Other studies focused on 
board composition influence on transmission decision and leadership instability (Alexander et 
al. 1993), on strategic change (Golden and Zajac, 2001, Westphal and Frederickson, 2001), on 
innovation  (Hoskisson  et  al.,  2002)  and  on  internationalization  (Tihanyi  et  al.,  2003). 
Recently,  Cowen  and  Marcel  (2011)  tested  the  effect  of  board  capital  (human  and  social 
capitals)  on  critical  decisions  taken  by  boards  as  dismissing  reputationnally  compromised 
directors. Using resource dependence theory, they argue that boards with greater dependence 
on  external  monitors  (board  interest  in  resource  provision)  are  more  likely  to  dismiss 
compromised directors. 
However, the results of these studies are mixed (Pugliese et al., 2009; Ravasi and Zattoni, 
2006; Charreaux, 2000; Heracleous, 2001; Pye and Camm, 2003), and provide a little support 
to  agency  theory  hypotheses  about  a  possible  systematic  relationship  between  board 
composition and critical corporate decisions (Deutsch, 2005). Furthermore, some authors as 
Pettigrew (1992), explain that this link don’t provide a direct evidence on the process and 
mechanisms which presumably link inputs to outputs. In other terms, the results of the study 
based on correlation tests do not allow to identify the reasons of the relationship (or the non-
relationship)  between  board  characteristics  and  corporate  decisions  i.e.  -  this  link  is  not 
systematic-. Thus, the process cannot be explained by studying the systematic link between 
these  two  dimensions  (Schilpzand  and  Martins,  2010).  Therefore,  it  is  recommended  to 
explore  not  only  structural  board  characteristics  but  also  cognitive  and  relational 
characteristics and determine how they  act in the development of the strategy (Pettigrew, 
1992, p. 171; Forbes and Milliken, 1999, p. 489). 29
3 Suggestion of operational model about board involvement in the strategic 
decision making process 
3.1  Set of board activities to  measure board involvement in the strategic decision 
making process 
In the table 2 (p. 12), we proposed a set of board activities that board members have the 
responsibility to participate in during the strategic process.  In empirical investigation, the 
degree of its involvement in each activity could be measured by likert scale (Antil, 1984; 
Barki and Hartwick, 1989).  
Barki and Hartwick argue, also, that sacking of conceptual clarity should be associated with 
antecedent (determinants factors) and effects (results). Thus, empirical test of the causes and 
effects of involvement should be carried out to better understand the extent and nature of 
involvement. In consequence, an empirical model of BD involvement in the strategic making 
process should be associated with determinants factors influencing the degree and nature of 
involvement and results that allow evaluation of BD involvement efficiency. 
3.2  Determinants factors influencing board involvement 
There is a  general agreement that specific  contextual factors have  an important effect on 
board involvement in its activities (Bammens, Voodeckers and Van Gils, 2011; Pugliese et 
al., 2009; Huse, 2005 and 2007; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999 etc.).  
Based  on  previous  literature  presented  in  section  2.2.2,  we  can  resume  the  antecedents’ 
factors  on  two  main  categories:  (1)  the  external  (outer)  context  (context  outside  the 
boardroom i.e. characteristics of the organization and it environment) and (2) the internal 
(inter) context related to board characteristics.  
Board Inter context
We  propose  to  consider  not  only  board  demographic  characteristics,  but  also  cognitive, 
relational and functioning characteristics. The following table present details about these inter 
factors. 30
Table 4 - Characteristics of the board of directors
Board characteristics  Details  Main references 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Size, independence, duality of functions, presence 
of women, foreign directors, age, directors 
representing employees, demographic diversity 
Jensen and Milliken (1976), 
Andrews (1981), Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Pfeffer (1983), 




Educational background (specialty and level), 
functional background, cognitive diversity, 
specific knowledge on company and its 
environment, specific expertise (strategy, finance, 
law, etc.) 
Huse (2007), Pugliese (2007) 
Forbe and Milliken (1999), 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), 
Rindova (1999), Charreaux 




Having developed networks (with external actors), 
being directors in other companies, organizational 
reputation, negotiation competences with 
management and external actors  
Huse (2007), Charreaux (2003), 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), 
Rouby (2008), etc.  
Functioning 
characteristics 
Meeting preparation, number and length of formal 
meetings, assiduity, informal meetings, training 
and procedure of directors’ evaluation, consulting 
extern consultants, committees (meetings, 
members, etc.)  
Lorsch and MacIver (1989), 
Huse (2007), Godard (2006), 
Gomez and Moore (2009), etc. 
Board outer context
The external factors refer to the general context in which boards work (Huse, 2007). Pye and 
Pettigrew  (2005,  p.  S33)  had  noted  that  contextual  contrasts  (as  economic,  regulatory, 
ownership structure, etc.) are of great interest and relevance in analyzing board process and 
that occur differences on board behaviors between organizations. In general, theses factors 
include  the  characteristics  of  the  organization  and  its  environment,  such  as  firm  size, 
industrial sector, ownership structure and firm life cycle. Environmental characteristics refer 
to the degree of uncertainty and complexity (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Charreaux, 2000) and 
legalistic  environment  (Huse,  2007).    These  characteristics  can  be  analyzed  distinctly  or 
together in a systematic representation. For example, in the French context Gomez (2009) 
propose five systems of governance to describe the representation of different French firms.  
3.3  Effects of board involvement 
 The literature about organizational outcomes in the board of director research (presented in 
the second section) highlights two main results: Board involvement in the strategic process 
could affect, on the one hand, corporate performance (Andrews, 1980; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Huse, 2007). And on the other hand, it affects strategic decisions considered as the last 
step  of  choice  process  (MacNulty  and  Pettigrew,  1999)  and  reflecting  the  efficiency  of 
board’s strategic contribution (Deutsch, 2005). We propose to use both financial and strategic 31
indicators to measure corporate performance. To describe the quality of the strategic decision, 
we propose characteristics as the nature (transitional or not), origin, degree of importance, 
rapidity and newness. The next figure summarizes links between board job involvement, its 
antecedents and effects.  




Inter factors  
(Board characteristics) 
- Demographic  
- Cognitive  
- Relational  
- Functioning  
Board of directors’ 
involvement in the strategic 
decision making process 
-  Analyzing  the  environment 
(opportunities/problems)  and  firm 
resources (forces/ weaknesses) 
-Identification  and  selection  of 
strategic options 
- Strategic implementation 
- Monitoring and evaluation   
Outer factors 
(Outside the boardroom) 





- Quantitative indicators  
- Qualitative indicators 
(achievement of strategic 
objectives, position of the 
company in the market, firm 
survival, product cost control, 
serenity of the social climate) 
Strategic decisions 
- Nature 
- Origin  
- Importance 
- Rapidity  
- Newness 32
Conclusion 
This  paper  reviews  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  about  board  of  directors 
involvement in the strategic decision making process. Since the last decade, academic interest 
in this topic has increased. The analysis of the literature revealed that it was mainly those 
studies with strategic and cognitive perspectives (i.e. with a focus on the board’s service and 
strategic  tasks)  that  advanced  the  understanding  of  how  and  why  boards  of  directors 
contribute in the strategic decision-making process (Westphal, 1999; Rindova, 1999; McNulty 
and Pettigrew, 1999; Charreaux, 2000, 2002, and 2005 etc.). In spite of the increasing number 
of  empirical  studies,  there  is  no  convergence  of  opinion  about  the  desirability  of  board 
involvement in the strategic process. Moreover, the literature reveals that the definition and 
use  of  “board  involvement”  are  different  from  each  study  to  other.  We  proposed, 
consequently, to start the paper by an analytical synthesis of definitions of ‘involvement’ ‘and 
board involvement’ in corporate governance and other fields of research. We proposed, also, a 
set  of  board  activities  referring  to  its  roles  crossing  the  steps  of  the  process  of  strategic 
decision making. Board involvement is measured by its total or partial participation in these 
activities  and  it  is  influenced  by  outer  and  inter  factors.  These  factors  are  relevant  to 
understand the process of board involvement, its effect on organizational outcomes and to 
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